Se afișează postările cu eticheta cyber. Afișați toate postările
Se afișează postările cu eticheta cyber. Afișați toate postările

duminică, 3 noiembrie 2019

Fresh Ursnif (GOZI/ ISFB) campaign

Some Russian campaign running over leaked email spreads different kind of malware. Today on Yahoo mail has come some fresh Ursnif with 0 detections. |
The domain used for my email was inactive and there was no file for download, but I found it somewhere else.
In the pictures below will find the research steps:
Was easy to find a sample of malware using the SHA256 (d6c0ca87f712c0633eab5ac020ceaad2e256cd3251808ce7c7b45faf4042123e) on Google.
The .zip file is detected and this may be an advantage for the users IF they are using the Antivirus that have on his database this sample… but this is another discussion…
At this moment the VirusTotal says 18/57.. so is going to be better in a few hours.
Now.. extracting them one by one we have a good encrypted malware named Ursnif (GOZI/ ISFB). This malware is trying to steal baking credentials from his victims and the hacker may have access to the system.
I will not explain the whole process at this time but the way to do that you will find it on the recent post I’ve made:
https://www.prodefence.org/malware-analysis-gozi-ifsb-bank-trojan-aka-ursnif/
Useful links:
Urlscan with samples
VirusTotal .zip
VirusTotal .js
VirusTotal .bin

sâmbătă, 7 septembrie 2019

Malware analysis Gozi IFSB – Bank Trojan aka Ursnif

This is the Gozi IFSB malware, created to steal data & informations from the victims. In the folder you will see all the files needed to create your own malware server.
For this malware analysis I will use an .bin found after google search.
Cyber security - Malware analysis
With this .bin file I will be 2 steps closer for the analysis. I don’t have the .doc/.pdf file with the payload, but the .bin is the downloaded file resulted from the payload.
I will transform the .bin file to infected.exe(10000.exe)!
008c4bd6ee834d113cfc693af0ea90396eaa47e860bcdd567ffd964b57434e1d.bin
MD5: e6d118192fc848797e15dc0600834783
SHA1: 16d5ded68677f4a870423d3fd30da8377a5b2408
Let’s go to security manipulation and creation of the malware on the system. The $LN33 it is exported by the executable, after that will jump to C Runtime Library.
Calling the security_init_cookie for buffer overrun protection to comprommise the system security.
Cyber security - Malware analysis Prodefence SRL
Let’s run the infected file to see his actions!
I see that the explorer.exe has some activiti.
Cyber security - Malware analysis
SC Prodefence SRL
Cyber security – Malware analysis
There I have some movements… let’s go to \Roaming\MIcrosoft\ to see the new folder created ‘BthM300C’.
SC Prodefence SRL
An executable(the same .exe with diffrerent name) created in new folder after runed the infected.exe / D3DCsapi.exe aka 1000.exe
Cyber security - Malware analysis
The Registry.
Cyber security - Malware analysis
Prodefence SRL
Now… the explorer.exe.
24 .dll are suspicious.
That means some of them are from the injection process.
Cyber security - Malware analysis
explorer.exe (2304)  – 52074 – 166.124.148.146.bc.googleusercontent.com.
This is an Google Cloud Platform and the explorer.exe has some connections there.
genesisgrandergh.at
  • Port: 62809, Dst Port: 53
  • Standard query response 0xd314 Server failure
  • ns1.suspended-domain.com
bitsupport.top
  • Standard query response 0xd314 Server failure
  • ns1.suspended-domain.com
carloslimmheklo.at
  • Port: 58097, Dst Port: 53
  • ns1.suspended-domain.com
databasecollection.pw  OK
  • Port: 62809, Dst Port: 53
  • Pubkey: 04b7b8c4d1d482255514ccf90c896acb7b5baaa7208eea67
Name Servers:
  • ns4.sinkhole.ch
  • ns3.sinkhole.ch
  • ns2.sinkhole.ch
  • ns1.sinkhole.ch
Now … becouse I have some extra informations.. I will try to find more infected domains.
The Gozi malware is using friendly websites to infect the visitors, others trojans or payloads included on .doc files, for better security bypass.
Virus Total Report
https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/008c4bd6ee834d113cfc693af0ea90396eaa47e860bcdd567ffd964b57434e1d/detection
sinkhole.ch server hosting malware
https://www.malwareurl.com/ns_listing.php?ns=ns2.sinkhole.ch
https://securitytrails.com/list/ns/NS1.SINKHOLE.CH?ref=abuseipdb
About Gozi(Ursniff)
https://www.secureworks.com/research/gozihttps://www.csoonline.com/article/2123315/identity-theft-prevention/inside-the-global-hacker-service-economy.html?page=2

marți, 27 februarie 2018

Credit card phishing – Iphone campaign

A new phishing campaign targeting fans of free Iphone.
The campaign targets the victims’ credit cards with a wonderful promise to win a Iphone.
Everything is visually prepared and it only remains for the victims to add their personal data.

Domains involted:
  • uploadocean.com/ – Adverts campaing
  • adminlady.info – Redirection
  • awarded.pw – Promoter
  • radiuniverse.com – hacked domain hosting the phishing page (or just owned by the hacker)
h**p://browser.awarded.pw/todays-winner/?winner=xx.xxx.xxx.xx&cc=RO&brw=Firefox&voluumdata=deprecated&eda=deprecated&cep=******&sourceid=57a5012f14822bf716721506&match=ron&carrier=wifi&mob_pf=windows&country=RO&cpc=0.0015
h**ps://ff.radiuniverse.com/n/iphonex/?transaction_id=102704cb8f7cc8e75a5a5705197330




This is all!!!
“Soon your card will be shopping without you!”

Have fun & Stay safe!

duminică, 4 februarie 2018

Browser Hijack – The journey – Cybersecurity research

A new software test.
Something announced as free … but it’s not really for free.
Today I wanted to see what level of browser hijacking is
running out there.
Browses hijack:
“A program changes your home page, redirects browser typos to a search engine you have never heard of or to other sites. This is annoying, popping up ads and displaying unwanted site”
So.
I have seen alot of ”good” things like: a java ”update”, winning iphones, free apps, cassino offers, games, some redirections… etc.


This code was injected in my browser.
”xxxx.rsc.cdn77.org install malicious extensions, plug-ins, ads, banner ads, pop-up ads, etc and creates mess on your browsers. Even if mistakenly you click on any ads or link then also it redirects you to some other websites. It also uses cookie and keep spy on your online activities like browsing history, mostly visited websites, login, password details, etc. The redirect virus has the ability to disable the anti-virus and other security program without your knowledge.” Source: removemalwarevirus.com

Here you can see some of the domains i visited in this journey:
  • rsc.cdn77[.]org
  • liveadexchanger[.]com
  • static.199.55.201.138.clients.your-server[.]de
  • timetrackingext.xyz
  • 2048-game[.]review
    search.findthatsearch[.]com
    findthatsearch[.]com
    minesweepx[.]com
    solitaire4u2[.]com
    tetrigame[.]com
    certifiedwinners[.]info
    wtrtr1[.]com
    ads.dlvr[.]live
    betano[.]com
    digitaldsp[.]com
    c.codeonclick[.]com
    join.pro-gaming-world[.]com
I found some extra files on my browsers… .js , .cfg and .dll.
3327329.js — ”pref(“general.config.obscure_value”, 0);pref(“general.config.filename”, “3321791.cfg”);pref(“network.proxy.type”, 2);pref(“network.proxy.autoconfig_url”, “http://unstop-access.biz/wpad.dat?cb241ce907c6857bc3c28a220ec2076437981150”);pref(“network.proxy.autoconfig_url.include_path”, true);”
3321791.js — ”pref(“general.config.obscure_value”, 0);pref(“general.config.filename”, “3327329.cfg”);pref(“network.proxy.type”, 2);pref(“network.proxy.autoconfig_url”, “http://unstop-access.biz/wpad.dat?cb241ce907c6857bc3c28a220ec2076437981150”);pref(“network.proxy.autoconfig_url.include_path”, true);”
Adware Agent – PUA.YoBrowser:
myographical.dll = sandastros.dll
  • MD5: 8ecbfcb3c062755a3d5b3851cbe98357
  • SHA-1: 5d1cccd87d0e4d81090d288d201d9c4467765513
Virus Total Report
Virus Total Graph

Fake Java Update

Virus Total Report
It is clear that it is not a pleasant trip for those who do not know how to protect themselves.
Have fun & Stay safe!!!
http://www.prodefence.org/

Blockchain phishing… Same campaign.. new domain.

I’m happy.
If I continue so.. I will become rich …

The same blockchain phishing campaign, but with new domain.


  • h**p://ainea.pro/2891/ INFO
  • h**p://schains.org/2183/ INFO
  • h**ps://blockch.ains.im/wallet/#/login INFO
# schains.org & bliockche.info  from the other post are in the same server LWSDNS.COM.
No further details are needed ….

2x Bitcoin scam – The magic application.

People still want to believe that the money are made easy with some application and without doing anything.
Click a button and you get money.
This weakness is exploited every day.
Here is a program that promises to double the profit by pressing that magic button.




To become credible, a demonstration video is a good way.
To become super credible, you make some false accounts and comment on your post.
This is a part of social engineering and works.

At one point, he changed his name, seeing he had potential victims in many countries.


Let’s see the application.
MD5: 19d6d6f312ec00998d379eec9fe21aa9
SHA-1: a5d27b1cf43cb5dcd7feeea279b70588c5910e12
*the -1 is mine! lol
It has a certain detection but insignificant.
The application does not steal, has no backdoor …

It is created by:
…looks like it’s his real name..
(his first name in the account is another … it seems to start with an M.)
As the application configuration looks like, it seems that the users who use it,are sending the bitcoin to an address added by the programmer.

After sending, they still expect someone to send them the double amount, but they will wait a lot and without success.
And let’s not forget … this is version 6.1!?!
We could continue because he still has some programs with such schemes, but time is limited!
In conclusion … I hope that Internet users will be more careful, do not believe in the wonders promised by the unknown!


Remember:
When something is free, you are not the customer but the product!


Have fun & Stay safe!!!

http://www.prodefence.org/bitcoin-scam-the-magic-application/

miercuri, 13 decembrie 2017

Apple ID and Credit Card Phishing – Cybersecurity research


Hello.
Today we will be investigating a phishing case.
Usually the attack of this type comes by email.
An email in which there is a text, a problem or a win and a link.
The text is made to make you go to the prepared website.
The link is usually hidden so you can not figure out where you are going and the hoax is easier.

Let’s start with the email I received so you can understand how you can protect yourself.
  1. Re: to what? Is this a response to an email that I sent to Apple? NO! … It’s a trick used to make you open the email believing it’s a response to an email sent by you.
  2. Apple support…. He caught your attention.
  3. Yandex?!? Yandex Browser is a freeware web browser. But it is still important. The Apple CEO sent you an email after he hired Yandex … that’s why he’s CEO .. to send email to users…
A link is hidden behind the button.
t.co is a Twitter shortener URL and behind this link is the true address we reach.

h**ps://t.co/BeOT0WkjXn =>
h**ps://twitter.com/safety/unsafe_link_warning?unsafe_link=https%3A%2F%2Fwia.email%2F =>
h**ps://apple.com.confirmation.account.centre.rin5de.center/
The good part is that when you are redirected …Twitter and Firefox warn you about the link you want to reach.
Let’s ignore everything this time …
What you see is a clone of the Apple website.
I’m not on some  cyber unit… yet….
Data entered on the fake page will be stored in the server.
So the hacker will know I’ve been around here.
Even if you log in with real data you will receive the same message to move on.
It will ask you to enter bank details to unlock your account and a identification document.

After all, it redirects you to the real Apple website and you’ll sign in to your unlocked account.
At this point you will be glad you did not lose your account, but in reality you gave to the hacker all your banking data + identification documents.

Still let’s see what’s in the main domain.
h**ps://rin5de.center
Index of/ … apple.com.confirmation.account.centre  here it’s the clone page created( old and still online 24.02.2017).
A cpanel and a hint for recover the password.
153.92.209.145:2083
Username: admin
Password: ?
Email: m—d@m—v.com
Name Servers:
ns7.wixdns.net
ns6.wixdns.net

And today…after 10 months online…

The Cpanel(153.92.209.145:2083)
I think the data I’ve entered was also convincing (Insider, cyberunit)
Have fun & Stay safe!!!